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PROBLEMS IN CONFLICTS
CH&ARIs McCAMIc*
"Private International Law" and "Comity" were formerly
familiar names in the law schools. All this is now embraced in
the term "Conflict of Laws". The first use of this description
"Conflict of Laws" in West Virginia seems to have occurred in
a decision of the Court of Appeals in 1895.' As understood in this
paper, Conflict of Laws is part of the common law of West Virginia and as such is as binding upon its courts as any other part
of the laws of the state. The case of Floyd v. National Loan &
Investment Company' was decided more than thirty years ago,
and it will be noticed that while Judge Poffenbarger in this ease
used the word "comity," as present understood the word seems
misplaced. A Michigan building and loan association admitted
to do business in West Virginia, had contracted in Michigan with
a West Virginia citizen, the contract to be performed in Michigan.
The security was a deed of trust upon real property situate in
West Virginia. In enforcing the trust deed the Judge grounded
his opinion partly upon the absolute right in the creditor to have
the Michigan contract enforced in West Virginia and partly upon
the doctrine that "comity" may be enforced. It is submitted that
there was no discretion in the West Virginia court in the matter
of enforcing the Michigan contract, it not being one opposed to
the public policy of the state, or immoral. Modern writers in
enforcing the contract would undoubtedly use the term "Conflict of Laws" rather than the archaic term "comity," and would
enforce the contract because the common law of West Virginia
* Member of the Bar, Wheeling, West Virginia.
1 Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W. Va. 212, 23 S. E. 692 (1895).
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recognizes the Michigan contract as one legal and binding, and
therefore capable of enforcement. To enforce such foreign right
in West Virginia is the law of West Virginia, and West Virginia
should do so without regard to any theory of reciprocity or
comity.
Jurisdiction
On the important subject of jurisdiction, the Conflict of Laws
Restatement of the American Law Institute does not define the
term in the narrow manner in which it is ordinarily used. Our
Supreme Court of Appeals has repeatedly said that jurisdiction is
the power to hear and determine.' There is scarcely a limit to
the cases sustaining this general proposition. While there also
seems to be at present a general tendency to enlarge the ordinary
definition to include not only the power to hear and determine but
to render the particular judgment in the particular case,' even
this liberalized definition does not present an adequate picture
of jurisdiction as defined in the Restatement. The definition in
section 43 is this:
"As used in this Subject, the word jurisdiction means
the power of a state to create rights which under the principles of the common law will be recognized as valid in other
states."
Consequently, when using the word "jurisdiction" in the sense
of the Restatement, its use, according to the reporter for the Institute, "is to be sharply distinguished from the other common
use of 'Jurisdiction,' as the power of a state to create rights that
will be recognized within its own territory.' "
West Virginia, under the historic Northwest Ordinance cession to the federal government by the Commonwealth of Virginia,
has jurisdiction over the Ohio river and also over as much of the
Big Sandy river as was formerly included in the Commonwealth
of Virginia.' The ownership of the Ohio River to the northwest
249
W. Va. 327, 38 S. E. 653 (1901).
3Simmons v. Simmons, 85 W. Va. 25, 100 S. E. 743 (1919); Sperry v.
Sanders, 50 W. Va. 70, 40 S. E. 327 (1901); Johnston v. Hunter, 50 W. Va.
52, 40 S. E. 448 (1901).
'Courts, 7 R. C. L. 1029.
5
Constitution of W. Va., art. II, § 1. But see the Constitution of W. Va.
(1863) art. I, § 2, under which the jurisdiction of the state is defined to
include "So much of the bed, banhs and shores of the Ohio river as heretofore appertained to the*state of Virginia," and the cession by the state of
Virginia in the northwest ordinance of the territory "situate, lying and being
to the Northwest of the river Ohio."
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shore is in West Virginia, and the state has jurisdiction over the
river. This river flows between West Virginia and other states,
and this physical fact presents a situation in which the use of the
word "jurisdiction" in the Restatement can be illustrated.
It is made an offense under West Virginia law to operate a
ferry over the Ohio river without a permit from the county court
of the county in which such ferry is to be operated.' This clearly
applies to a ferry whose seat is in West Virginia, but as the Ohio
river flows between the State of West Virginia and the State of
Ohio, it seems manifest that ferries whose seats are in Ohio could
operate from the Ohio shore to West Virginia without violating
the West Virginia statute. West Virginia has the undoubted right
to decide for itself if an offense has been committed under West
Virginia statutes. This proposition actually arose in West Virginia in 1903. One Faudre had been convicted in Mason County
for ferriage from Ohio to West Virginia, contrary to rates of
ferriage fixed by the County Court of Mason County.' His defense was an ordinance of Gallipolis, Ohio, establishing the ferry
from Ohio, and fixing the rate of ferriage. The conviction was
reversed, there being separate opinions by Judges Brannon, Poffenbarger and Dent. Judge Brannon's opinion dodged the question of the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of West Virginia
over the Ohio River, and was based upon the proposition that there
was "concurrent jurisdiction" between the states of West Virginia and Ohio. Judge Poffenbarger did not agree "to all that
is said in the opinion on the subject of concurrent jurisdiction
and the character of the ferry franchise." He thought the State
of Ohio had a right as sovereign to grant a valid ferry franchise
and the owner of such franchise charging the Ohio rate was "innocent of any violation of the West Virginia ferry law in so doing." Judge Dent concurred in the conclusion of Judge Brannon;
but with reservations, expressing the views that the title of West
Virginia ran "to low water mark on the Ohio side, and Ohio the
land between high and low water mark on the same side, which
necessarily includes the shore."
He concluded, therefore, that
"to make a complete ferry from shore to shore, both going and
coming, requires the consent of both states", and he also expressed
the belief that there should be a mutual compact between Ohio
W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 17, art. 18, § 6.
v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 46 S. E. 269, 63 L. R. A. 877 (1904).
8In these days it certainly would not be considered proper for a county
court to fix rates of ferriage.
7State
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and West Virginia to fix the boundary line by permanent monuments, "so as not to permit it to be subject to the changes of the
bed and shores of the river caused by natural and artificial
The two
fluctuations. Wisdom would dictate such a course."
separate opinions of Judge Poffenbarger and Dent, especially that
of the latter, come closer to announcing the definition of jurisdiction as given by the Restatement than does the opinion of Judge
Brannon. Instead of being "concurrent" - it seems to the writer to be a created right which is recognized as valid under common law principles in other states. The Ohio river is the boundary
between two states in which there is a flowing stream of water. A
citizen of either state, or of any state or country, has the right to
be on the river for lawful purposes. That right, even though the
flowing water is wholly in West Virginia, must be recognized in
other states. In this sense is the word "jurisdiction" used in
the Restatement.
The ferry franchise granted by the City of Gallipolis, Ohio, to
the Ohio citizen would not be enforced in West Virginia. Assume that the attempted landing place in West Virginia of this
Ohio ferry is on the wharf of a West Virginia city and a license
is required in West Virginia for a ferry to use or land at the
wharf. It is not seen how the Ohio ferry franchise would permit
such landing at the wharf. This principle is recognized in the
Restatement. It seems to have been decided in West Virginia as
far back as 1884 in the case of Nimick & Co. v. Mingo Iron
Works.9 A manufacturing corporation had been incorporated in
the State of Ohio, under the laws of which state there was an additional 100 per cent liability on shareholders over and above the
par value of stock owned by them. A creditor obtained a judgment in Ohio against the corporation, and a suit in equity was
brought in Ohio County, West Virginia, against stockholders,
residents of Ohio County, to enforce such double liability. A
demurrer was sustained. The Supreme Court of Appeals while
holding (perhaps obiter) that the shareholders were liable, yet
held the remedy was under the Ohio law, where it should be enforced."
These two cases seem to recognize the rule of the Restatement and its limitation.
125 W. Va. 184 (1884).

2' See discussion under "corporations,"

infra.
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The Fourteentk Amendment
But the power exercised by the state to create such rights, the
Restatement declares, must not be in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Vested property rights are protected by this
amendment and such rights can be taken away only by due process of law.' Property outside the jurisdiction of the state is
beyond the state's taxing power, and the execution of a tax upon
it is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
Other instances of this principle have arisen in Wrest Virginia. In Harvey v. Dillon,"' a chattel real had been assessed for
taxation under an Act of the Legislature of 1905, and the claim
was made that such tax violated the Fourteenth Amendment. But
the land and the chattel real were held separate and so taxable.
This seems to be correct.
The jurisdiction defined in the Restatement includes persons
&
and things.
' Things in general include immovables such as land
and chattels, both tangible and intangible. As to land, comment
is hardly necessary. It is subject to the lex rei sitae." With chattels many questions have arisen and many more can arise. The
taxation of moveables, for example, has arisen in various cases of
oil in pipe lines. 7
Titles Merged in Documents
It often arises that the title to a chattel is represented by or
merged in a document, such as negotiable bills of lading, ware'CONFLICT OF LAwS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 44. This work
will hereinafter be cited as the Restatement.
"White v. Crump, 19 W. Va. 583,.592 (1882).
"Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans. 205 U. S. 395, 399, 27 S. Ct.
499 (1907).
"159 W. Va. 605, 53 S. E. 928, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 628 (1906).
21§ 47. "Jurisdiction is exercised over a person or a thing by creating
rights which affect the person or thing."
"1§48. A state has jurisdiction over a person:
(a) If he is within the territory of the state;
(b) If he is domiciled in the state, although not present in the
state; or
(c) If he has consented or subjected himself to the exercise of jurisdiction over him, either before or after the exercise of jurisdiction."
'5Witt.en v. St. Clair, 27 W. Va. 762 (1886).
7West Virginia Pipe Line Co. v. State of West Virginia, 95 W. Va. 285,
120 S. E. 759 (1923); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265, 42
S. Ct. 101 (1921) reversing 87 W. Va. 396, 105 S. E. 506 (1920); Ozark Pipe
Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 S. Ct. 184 (1925); Peoples Gas Co.
v. Pub. Service Com., 270 U. S. 550, 46 S. Ct. 371 (1926).
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house receipts, automobile titles and stock certificates. No attempt
is made in the Restatement to state the extent to which in various
situations property rights are merged in the domuments."
Under the West Virginia statute," it is made extremely difficult to attach, suggest, garnish or subject to execution goods
delivered to a warehouseman. They cannot be so reached while
in the possession of the warehouseman, if a negotiable receipt is
issued for them, "unless the receipt be first surrendered to the
warehouseman or its negotiation enjoined". Nor can the warehouseman be compelled "to deliver up the actual possession of the
goods until the receipt is surrendered to him or impounded by the
court." Any other principle would destroy the negotiability of
the receipt.'
The transfer of a motor vehicle requires an assignment of the
certificate of title,' and it is unlawful to operate a motor vehicle
in West Virginia without "first procuring a certificate of title".'"
Garnishment of Corporate Stock
The new Code of West Virginia,' it is suggested, differs from
the Restatement. It is believed that it has also materially changed
the law in this state relative to attachment of shares of stock. Such
shares are, of course, personal property. In this respect the law
is unchanged. As such the intangibles, the certificates, at common
'8RESTATEMENT, §

53:

" (1)
To the extent of which title to a chattel is merged in a document
by the law which governed the chattel at the time the document was
issued, title to the chattel is (exclusively) subject to the jurisdiction of
the state which has jurisdiction over the document, except as stated in
Subsection (2).
" (2)
The State in which the chattel is may enforce
(a) rights growing out of acts done in the preservation of the
property;
(b) rights essential to the exercise of the State's police powers;
(c) rights dependent upon the exercise of the power of eminent
domain."
"See W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 47, art. 5, § 25; c. 38, art. 7, § 25.
"See the RESTATEMENT, § 53, set out in n. 18, supra.
21W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 17, art. 7, § 2.
2'W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 17, art. 7, § 3.
"W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 17, art. 7, § 3, provides:
"Shares of stock are personal property, and, as such, shall pass to the
legal representative of the stockholder, and be subject to legal process.
No levy of an execution, attachment, or other process, upon shares of
stock for which a certificate is outstanding, shall be valid until such certificate be actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy,
or be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or its transfer by
the holder be enjoined. Except where a certificate is lost or destroyed,
such corporation shall be required to issue a new certificate for the stock
until the outstanding certificate is surrendered to it."
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law are not subject to attachment.' But the West Virginia Code
of 1 8 9 9 ' declared such shares to be personal estate and constituted a fieri facias a lien from the time it was delivered to the
levying officer "upon the personal estate" of the judgment debtor,
and as such it was a lien even upon property "not capable of being levied on.''' The method of enforcement of such lien was by
suit in equity.' But under the Lipscomb case,' the service of the
writ must have been on the corporation in which the stock was
issued. Consequently, a service made on a pledgee who was the
holder of the certificate of stock pledged was not a good service.
One might have had in West Virginia, a case of a debtor owning
a large number of shares in a foreign corporation not doing business in West Virginia, with a large equity therein. The shares
may have been pledged, and the pledgee served, but no jurisdiction
would have been obtained thereby over the shares. This situation was before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1925,'
and a different result was reached. The Public Trustee of England (an officer corresponding to our Alien Property Custodian)
seized in England shares of stock in the United States Steel Corporation, registered on the books of the corporation in the names of
persons domiciled in England, and endorsed in blank on the backs
of the certificates. The Disconto-Geseilsehaft purchased certain of
these certificates thus endorsed, which it held in its London branch.
Its rights were transferred to the Public Trustee pursuant to the
powers under the War Acts, and the certificates were seized. The
title was claimed by the Public Trustee pursuant to the Treaty
of Berlin and the Treaty of Versailles. Suits filed in New York
in the District Court of the United States reached the Supreme
Court, and the opinion there was by Mr. Justice Holmes. The
Court would not draw "a line of fire" around the boundaries of
the State of New Jersey - where the United Steel Corporation
was incorporated, and declining to recognize that "nothing concerning the corporation or any interest in it" could happen out2Lipscomb's Adm'r. v. Condon, 56 W. Va. 416, 49 S. E. 392, 67 L. R. A.
670 (1905).
C. 53, § 20.
ra0. 141, § 2.
^'Union Bank, etc. v. Hutchinson, etc., 161 S. E. 599 (W. Va. 1931); Lambert v. Huff, 82 W. Va. 562, 95 S. E. 1031 (1918).
28Supra n. 24.
-1 Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U. S. Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22, 45
S. Ct. 207 (1925).
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side preferred "to consider itself civilized and to act accordingly."
The Court said:
"Therefore New Jersey having authorized this corporation like others to issue certificates that so far represent the
stock that ordinarily at least no one can get the benefits of
ownership except through and by means of the paper, it
recognizes as owner anyone to whom the person declared by
the paper to be owner has transferred it by the indorsement
provided for, wherever it takes place. It allows an indorsement in blank, and by its law as well as by the law of England an indorsement in blank authorizes anyone who is the
lawful owner of the paper to write in a name, and thereby
entitle the person so named to demand registration as owner
in his turn upon the corporation's books. But the question
who is the owner of the paper depends upon the law of the
place where the paper is. It does not depend upon the holder's having given value or taking without notice of outstanding claims but upon the things done being sufficient by the
laws of the place to transfer the title. An execution locally
valid is as effectual as an ordinary purchase. Yazoo &
Mississippi Valley R. R. Co. v. Clarksdale, 257 U. S. 10 (42 S.
Ct. 27, 66 L. Ed. 104). The things done in England transferred the title to the Public Trustee by English law."
The owner of the paper - the stock certificate - depended
in this case upon the law of the place where the paper was. The
Restatement declares the law" to be that "the share certificate is
subject to the jurisdiction of the state within whose territory it
is." But the law of West Virginia, by reason of adoption of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, where certificates of stock have been
issued declares no levy
"shall be valid until such certificate be actually seized
by the officer making the attachment or levy, or be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or its transfer by the
holder be enjoined."'
This statute it seems to the writer is in conflict with the Restatement and is unjustified. It is a backward step from the provisions contained in the old Code, for under it, service could be
made on the corporation itself.' Now, such service even on the
corporation issuing the certificates is ineffectual unless the certificates be surrendered to it. This seems to be drawing a "line of
fire" around the holders of certificates of stock, which unnecessarily
See RESTATEMENT, § 57.
W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) e. 31, art. 1, § 53.
See Lipscomb 's Adm'r. v. Condon, supra n. 24.
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impedes a creditor seeking to enforce a claim against the stock,
or against any equity remaining over and beyond the amount for
which the certificate has been pledged and delivered. The writer
can see no reason for such distinctions as to personal property.
Personal property in tangibles can be seized and sold, but personal property in intangibles without justification or excuse is,
contrary to the Restatement, placed in a class by itself. True, the
statute now providese such creditor
"whose debtor is the owner of a certificate shall be entitled to
such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdiction, by injunction and otherwise, in attaching such certificate or in satisfying the claim by means thereof as is allowed at law or in
equity, in regard to property which cannot readily be attached or levied upon by ordinary legal process."
This section does not seem to be adequate in view of the provision
requiring the actual seizure of the certificate, or surrender of the
same to the corporation.
Exercise of Jurisdiction
The Restatement provides that the instrumentalities through
which jurisdiction is exercised are executive, administrative, legislative and judicial. The legislative jurisdiction may be exercised
by "adopting certain principles of law as part of the common
law of the state, or by an act of a legislative body."'
This states
the law of West Virginia, where both methods have been pursued.'
The legislature meets biennially and little reference need be made
to this familiar method. The Public Service Commission Act has
been upheld as creating an agency for carrying out the legislative
scheme with respect to public service corporations.' The circuit
courts have the power to issue certificates of incorporation of towns
and villages with populations under 2000.' The ordinances of
SW. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art 1, § 54.
See RESTATEifENT, § 64.

"Constitution of W. Va. (1863) art. XI, § 8; Constitution of W. Va. (1872)
art. VIII, § 21; Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, syl. 1 (1869):
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the
principles of the bill of rights and constitution of the State of Virginia,
was in force in that State when the constitution of this State took effect,
and is, therefore, the law of the State unless repealed or modified by the
general assembly of Virginia or the legislature of this State."
"Manufacturers Light & Heat Co. v. Ott, 215 Fed. 940 (D. C., N. D. W.
Va., 1914).
I"Burgess v. M eNinch, 104 W. Va. 251, 139 S. E. 743 (1927).
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cities are legislative in character.' The Workmen's Compensation
Act is another example.
The legislative jurisdiction by section 68 of the Restatement
is extended beyond the limits of the state under the doctrine of
allegiance owed to the state. The section reads as follows:
"A state which in the law of nations has standing as a
nation has jurisdiction over its nationals wherever they may
be to the extent of forbidding them to do an act. The exercise of this jurisdiction must not involve a violation of the
law or public policy of the state where the national is."
State Line Cases
West Virginia has a series of statutes" concerning prosecutions for offenses committed wholly or in part within the state,
offenses committed near county boundary lines, and duelling." In
the duelling statute we have a direct provision:
"If any person resident in this State, by previous agreement made within the same, fight a duel without the State,
and in so doing inflict a mortal wound, he shall be deemed
guilty of murder in this State."
And the prosecution may be in the county in this state where
death occurs, and if the death occurs outside the state, then the
prosecution may be in any county of the state where the offender
may be found. This statute does not seem to be based upon the
theory of the Restatement in Section 68, but is based rather upon
the agreement to fight a duel made in the state by a resident of
the state.
One of the cases in the Supreme Court of Appeals arose in
1892 under the boundary statute." In this case the mortal blow
was actually struck in Kentucky, but the death occurred in Logan
County, West Virginia, where the accused, confined in jail on
process from a justice of the peace, applied in the Circuit Court
of Logan County, for a habeas corpus. It was denied, and a writ
of error was obtained from the Supreme Court of Appeals. Judge
Brannon wrote the opinion and inquired: "Can a state punish an
act done outside its territory? It seems to be an axiom that a
state's criminal law is of no force beyond its limits". And he inquired if the deceased "had died in Kentucky, could this state
"Shepherd v.
S"W. VA. REV.
- W. VA. REV.
"MceNeely ex

City of Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635 (1887).
CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 11, §§ 10-12.
CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 2, § 18 et seq.
parte, 36 W. Va. 84, 14 S. E. 436, 15 L. R. A. 226 (1892).
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try .... even if she htad a statute extending so far?" The
statute cited was held valid. Under the Restatement, if the deceased had died in Kentucky, West Virginia could have punished,
if it had had a statute forbidding the act to be done. Judge Brannon did not discuss the doctrine of state allegiance in his opinion.
An argument can be made against the rule in Section 68 of
the Restatement based upon the following language of Judge
Brannon in this case: "Wherein a state assumes criminal jurisdiction over crimes done within another it would seem to be without
The language is wholly obiter, however, and is to be
power."
contrasted to the holding in Weil v. Black.' Judge Brannon was
not on the Court of Appeals at this time.
Judge Williams wrote the opinion in the latter case, in which
it is submitted, the court went farther than the doctrine of the
Restatement. It will be noted that Section 68 of the Restatement
limits the exercise of jurisdiction by a state to "its nationals
wherever they may be to the extent of forbidding them to do an
act"." In the above case the indictment was based upon an alleged
act committed, if at all, in the State of Pennsylvania, by a then
national of Pennsylvania who had never been a national of West
Virginia. The substance of the argument made by Judge Williams
is set out below.' It may be argued against this theory that it was
a case of an accessory before the fact, but the indictment was susMO'i4., at 36 W. Va. 95:
"Virginia, as far back as 1840, enacted that if a blow be given in the
State, and death result in another State, prosecution might be in Virginia,
inthe county of the blow, but, though her criminal law has undergone
several revisions and though England and several of the States of this
Union had legislation punishing as murder cases where the blow
was without but death within England or the State, Virginia has never
adopted it. Did she doubt it validity? It was inserted in our Code in
1882. But, though I have doubts on the subject, we must not forget that
the legislature, composed of many men of legal ability and learning, and
vested by the people with the law-making power of the State, has approved
this provision. A court must be slow and cautious to overthrow its action.
In none but a case of very plain infraction of the constitution, where there
is no escape, will or ought a court to do so. To doubt only is to affirm
the validity of its action. I resolve my doubt in this way."
376 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666 (1915).
"See RESTAT MENT, § 49.
"Weil v. Black, Judge, supra n. 43, at 76 W. Va. 694:
"But it is held in all jurisdictions, where the English common law
prevails, that, independent of statute, a person without the realm or
state who consummates a crime within it, by means of an innocent agent,
is a principal in the first degree and punishable where the crime is consummated, such an one being considered, by a fiction of law, as present
where the crime is committed. But, of course, that principle could have
no application in this case, even in the absence of any statute, because it
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tained by reason of the statute of West Virginia' and that statute
does not limit the jurisdiction to nationals. (It is a pleasure to
add here that the party indicted in the above case was later wholly
vindicated). The case of Weil 'v. Black can be reconciled with
Section 70 of the Restatement to the effect that "If consequences
of an act done in one state occur in another state, each state in
which any event in the series of act and consequences occurs may
apply its law to the event".
JudicialExercise
Section 76 of the Restatement reads: "A state exercises judicial jurisdiction by formal decision of an officer or body acting
judicially," and Section 78 imposes the limitation that "within
the limits of its jurisdiction, but not beyond, a state can exercise
judicial jurisdiction".
With these statements the law of West Virginia is in accord."
In some instances, the jurisdiction has not been exercised through
or by courts, but the acts of the officers or legislative bodies have
been held to be judicial. Thus the official act of taking and certifying the acknowledgment and privy examination of a married
woman to a deed has been declared judicial." The legislature may
in the exercise of its police power prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations for admission to the bar which will be followed by the
courts, and the courts passing upon the right to be admitted to
practice law will treat as prima facie only a certificate of good
moral character of the county court." A board of registration acts
judicially in determining whether or not a voter is entitled to be
registered as such.' The same is true of a county court in appointing personal representatives even though an infant is appointed as such, since such infant occupies a de facto position,"1
of a board of commissioners acting in lieu of a county court in
appears from the very nature of the transactions alleged that the agent
was not ignorant of them.
"There is no lack of jurisdiction in the intermediate court of Kanawha
county because the offense which the indictments purport to charge is
alleged to have been committed in the state of Pennsylvania, when other
averments show that the acts of the principal were consummated in Kanawha County, West Virginia."
'SW. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 61, art. 11, §§ 6, 7.
"Johnston v. Hunter, 50 W. Va. 52, 40 S. E. 448 (1901).
"Henderson v. Smith, 26 W. Va. 829, 53 Am. Rep. 139 (1885).
"In re Application for License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 67 S. E.
597 (1910) (3 to 2 decision).
0Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W. Va. 486, 20 Am. Rep. 431 (1873).
Tomblin v. Peck, 73 W. Va. 336, 80 S. E. 450 (1913).
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hearing and determining charges of misconduct of a justice of the
peace,' and of a county court in laying a special levy to build
bridges, and mandamus will lie to compel an assessor to extend
A reassessment of property for taxation purposes
such levy.'
made by the commissioner of reassessment under the former policy
of the state requiring such to be made every ten years' and the
valuation made by an assessor of property for purposes of taxatione have been considered judicial determinations.
A decision holding judicial the determining of what property is liable for taxation has been questioned by Judge PoffenBut, so far as the writer can debarger in Webb v. Ritter.'
termine, the decision has not been overruled. Proceedings by a
town council to abate a nuisance may be judicial.'
Legislative Exercise
While these decisions seem clear, others equally clear make
rulings that certain other officers do not act judicially.
A special tribunal acting under the provisions of the Code
of West Virginia in hearing a contest over the election of the
Treasurer, Auditor, State Superintendent of Free Schools, Attorney General and Circuit Judges,"' is a subordinate legislative
tribunal and not a court.' The reasoning of this case appears unsatisfactory. It seems largely an ipse dixit. The Code names the
special tribunal "a special court", but because the Legislature
-2Arkle v. Board of Com'rs., 41 W. Va. 471, 23 S. E. 804 (1895).
" Plesaants County Court v. Brammer, 68 W. Va. 25, 69 S. E. 450 (1910).
State v. South Penn Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S. E. 688 (1896).
Wheeling Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Paull, Judge, 39 W. Va. 142, 19
S. B. 551 (1894).
0 Stockton v. Craig, 56 W. Va. 464, 49 S. E. 386 (1904), citing Wheeling v.
Paull, supra n. 55; Charleston Bridge Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 658,
24 S. E. 1002 (1896); Cunningham v. Brown, 39 W. Va. 588, 20 S. E. 615

(1894).
60 W. Va. 193, 211, 54 S. E. 484 (1906):
"A-fter having thoroughly considered this question, in the light of
what is said in the opinion of Stockton v. Craig, and the briefs submitted
in this case, I am thoroughly convinced that the duties of assessors and
clerks of the county courts, concerning the entry of land in the land books,
for the purposes of taxation, are purely ministerial. And I do not think
by what he said in the opinion in that case, concerning
JUDGE DE,
judicial and quasi-judicial functions, performed by such officers, in
determining what to enter and what not to enter, for such purposes, intended to be understood as asserting that their decisions had the force
and effect of judicial determinations. . . "
Town of Davis v. Davis, 40 W. Va. 464, 21 S. E. 906 (1895).
"' See W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c.6, § 15; W. VA. REV. CODE
(1931) c. 3, art. 9, § 13.
coMcWhorter v. Dorr, 57 W. Va. 608, 50 S. E. 838, 110 Am. St. Rep. 815
(1905).
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decides the election of a contest over the Governor's office and a
circuit court in incorporating a city, town or village has been held
to act as a subordinate tribunal of the Legislature,' the court concludes "a special court" is also such subordinate tribunal.
Corporations
The subject of corporations, as is to be expected, is one of the
most important topics in the Restatement. The Restatement
recognizes the well grounded principles derived from the Roman
law that a corporation is a juristic person distinct from the natural persons who compose and manage it; that its creation is by
the power of the state, which also has the power of visitation over
the creature; that the title to corporate property is recognized as
distinct from that of any of its shareholders; and that the shareholders are exempt from the debts of the juridical entity. These
principles came into Britain and to England from the classical
writers."
Visitatory Powers
West Virginia has declared the law to be that a corporation
is a resident of the state by which it is incorporated, and that too,
independent of the places where the stockholders reside. ' In
this respect it recognizes the principle of the Roman law, that the
state and the state only has the power to create corporations. The
visitatory power of West Virginia over corporations is retained
in the statutes of the state. ' An example of this power is found
in the law creating the auditor attorney in fact for all domestic
corporations and for every foreign corporation doing business
within the state, with power to accept service of process and notice
on behalf of every such corporation!' and each corporation is required to pay the state an annual fee of ten dollars for such
service. ' The extent of the exercise of these powers has not been
"In re Town of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894). This
holding has been upheld on the doctrine of stare decisis in Hodges v. Public
Service Com'n., 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).
02 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1911)
488
et seg.: " ..... lawyers from the thirteenth century onwards have been
wont to attribute to the corporation a 'personality' that is 'fictitious' or
'artificial'."
Also Howe Studies in Civil Law, p. 50.
0'
Rece v. Newport News Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 9 S. E. 212, 3 L. R. A. 572
(1889) ; Hall v. Bank of Virginia, 14 W. Va. 584, 621 (1878).
" For provision for winding up the business of a corporation, domestic or
foreign, see W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, §§ 82, 83.
0'
W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 71.
18W. VA. Ruv. CODE (1931) c. 11, art. 12, § 73.
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exhausted. It may well be that the state would have power to
provide that service could be made on the state auditor on behalf
of all shareholders comprising the corporation doing business in
the state. In this event, if suit had to be brought to enforce a
statutory liability against any such shareholder even though he
were a non-resident such jurisdiction would be had.
Sharewtlders' Liability

The RESTATEMENT in Sections 203 and 204 provides:
"The existence and extent of the liability of a shareholder for assessments or to contribute to the corporation for
the payment of debts of the corporation is determined by the
law of the state of incorporation.
"The liability of a shareholder to contribute to the corporation can be enforced in any state which provides a remedy
adapted to the purpose."
In accordance with Section 203, we find that the Revised Code
of West Virginia7 does define in part the liability of a shareholder. Such liability is briefly, except in case of banking institutions, limited to the amount of the price of the stock subscribed
for by him and unpaid. This seems clear enough. But suppose
we have a foreign corporation - not a banking institution - admitted to do business in the state, where by the laws of the foreign
state in which it is incorporated, the shareholders are liable for
an additional amount over the price of the subscribed stock. We
will again suppose we have residents of West Virginia as shareholders in such foreign corporation. It becomes insolvent and a
receiver is appointed in the state of its incorporation. A call is
made on the shareholders to pay such additional amount. A shareholder in West Virginia declines to pay, and the receiver sues, we
will assume, in a West Virginia Court. Under the law of West
Virginia such liability does not exist. The statute provides that
foreign corporations admitted to do business in West Virginia
"shall have the rights, powers and privileges, and be subject to the same regulations, restrictions and liabilities conferred and imposed on corporations chartered under the laws
of this State.' ''
Can the suit be maintained? The statute provides
". ... No person or corporation shall institute or prosecute any suit in any court in this State to enforce any lia'TC. 31, art. 1, §§ 33-36.
03W, VA. REV, CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 79.
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bility against the subscriber to, or purchaser of the shares of
stock of, any corporation chartered under the laws of another
state in excess of what the liability of such subscriber or purchaser would have been if such corporation had been chartered under this chapter".
While the Code revisers express some doubt of the constitutionality of this section, no opinion is expressed herein, but the question is treated merely as a problem in conflicts. The REsTATE]m1NT
declares that the liability of the shareholder is determined by the
law of the state of incorporation. In West Virginia, at least, the
public policy of the state is declared to be that as tQ domestic corporations (banking institutions excepted) no such liability exists.
But the contract of the shareholder is a valid one in the state of
incorporation. Primafacie, therefore, it is valid in West Virginia
under the Restatement, for as we have seen, the rules governing
conflict of laws are, by the Restatement, parts of the common law
of the state and bindinge' and as such a foreign right should not
be refused enforcement here, for the reason that the contract is
valid in the state where made and should be governed by that
law.' The problem, however, is not solved by this apparently
simple statement. Is there a public policy in West Virginia against
such claimed liability? If so the Restatement expressly recognizes
the public policy as binding on the courts of West Virginia."
Public Policy and Enforcement
Is there a public policy in West Virginia against the enforcement of such liabilities? The present Code provides that receivers of corporations, appointed by the circuit courts, for corporations
"heretofore or hereafter chartered by another state which
may' have done business, or acquired property or contracted
debts in this State, and any of whose creditors or stockholders
0W. VA.REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 36.
0 § 5. "Conflict of Laws is a part of the common law, and as such is as
binding upon the courts as any other parts of the law of the state."
'*RESTATEMENT,

72

§ 7:

"Except as stated in Section 8, if the existence of a right alleged to
have been created in one state is brought in question in a court of another
state, the question will be determined by that court, applying only such
part of the law of the first state as determines in that state the efeation
of like rights involving no question of foreign law."
RESTATEMENT, § 176:

"No power given to a foreign corporation by the law of the state
of incorporation can give it a right to do any act which a corporation as
such is forbidden to do by the law of the state in which the act is done."
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or their personal representatives, or debtors, reside in this
State; and the circuit court of any county wherein such creditor, stockholder or their personal representatives, or person
indebted to the corporation, may reside, or wherein such assets or property or any part thereof may be, shall afford such
relief as is appropriate under this and the preceding seetion. "
These sections are substantially the sections of the former Code."'
The statute seems to have been passed originally to meet the decision in the case of Nimick v. Iron Works." In this case decided
in 1884, an Ohio manufacturing corporation was named defendant with others at the suit of a judgment creditor of the corporation. Under the laws of Ohio the shareholders of the Iron Works
were liable for an additional sum equal to the amount of the subscription. A number of the shareholders resided in West Virginia.
A judgment having been obtained in Ohio against the corporation,
the judgment creditor sued the resident West Virginia shareholders in West Virginia to enforce an extra liability on the stock
subscription. On demurrer the bill was dismissed, the Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed the decree, and the plaintiff was remitted to the State of Ohio for enforcement of the remedy
"where the corporation was created, organized and located; where its business was transacted, and by the local
statutes of which State alone, this individual liability exists.
....
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the
question, whether the statute of Ohio, which imposes upon the
stockholders of said corporation this individual personal
liability, is in conflict with the policy and legislation of this
State on the same subject, upon which no opinion is intended
to be expressed."
When the subsequent cases of Swing v. Bentley"' and Swing
v. Parkersburg ' were decided in 1897, we had the statute law
found in the West Virginia Code of 1923,' which expressly gave
leave to the receiver or a creditor to sue.
Judge Dent for the
court treated the law as announced in the Nimick case superseded
by an act of 1895."' These decisions, while apparently in point,
are not entirely satisfactory, and it is not believed the question
xiW. VA. RLV. CODE (1931) C. 31, art. 1, § 82.
7' W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 53, §§ 58, 59.
x Supra n. 9.
7045 W. Va. 283, 31 S. E. 925 (1898).
45 W. Va. 288, 31 S. E. 926 (1898).

-C.

53, §§ 58, 59.

71Acts of W. Va., 1885, c. 39.
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is fully and emphatically decided. On the facts as stated there
appears to be no question of the liability of a shareholder for any
additional amount. The suits were in assumpsit by the trustee of
the creditors of stockholders of a mutual fire insurance company
of Ohio against the maker of a note on a special assessment for the
"balance on said note made by him (the trustee) by virtue of the
laws of Ohio." The cases reached the Supreme Court on sustained
demurrers, which rulings were reversed. Judge Dent said:
"the law is now settled by an irresistable preponderance
of authority that a receiver, trustee, or assignee of a foreign
corporation, with general powers over the property of such
corporation, has the right, by virtue of the comity existing
between the various states of this Union, to sue for any debt,
claim or property owing to or belonging to such corporation."
Referring to the Nimick case it is said:
"The decision which was rendered November 29, 1884,
was superseded by chapter 39, Acts 1885, which gave the circuit courts of this State jurisdiction to appoint receivers for
and wind up the affairs, in proper cases therein set forth, of
foreign corporations who have done business, acquired property, and contracted debts in this State. See sections 58, 59,
c. 53, Code. By virtue of these sections suits may be brought
in the name of dissolved corporations, foreign and domestic,
so far as necessary or proper, 'for collecting the debts and
claims due to the corporation, converting its property and
assets into money, prosecuting and protecting its rights, enforcing its liabilities and paying over and distributing its
property and assets, or the proceeds thereof, to those entitled
thereto. ' "
and then the court itself expressed the doubt raised in this
paper:
....This is not a general assessment upon unpaid stock
on all stockholders, as in the case of Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U.
S., 319 (9 Sup. Ct., 739), and other cases of similar character
relied on by plaintiff, but it is a specific assessment on a note
limited by express agreement to the 'losses and expenses incurred by the company.' If the company itself had made the
assessment, although the same rules so far as applicable govern in both characters of cases, it would have been bound to
show, on resistance of payment thereof, that it was within the
liability covered by the note, as the proof of the same is
wholly within its power. Such being the case as to the company, its trustee could have no greater power. Nor does it
entail any hardship upon him, as all the proofs are in his

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol38/iss4/3

18

McCamic: Problems in Conflicts

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
hands and under his control. This, however, is a question of
proof, and does not arise on demurrer, which admits the truth
of the allegations contained in the declaration. These appear
to be sufficient to justify a recovery, if sustained by
proof .......
Powers of Foreign Corporations in the State
The Restatement declares that except as forbidden by the
Constitution of the United States, a state may refuse to allow a
foreign corporation to do business in the state. ' The carrying on
of interstate and foreign commerce cannot be interfered with by a
state. The law of West Virginia seems to be the same.' A foreign
corporation may hold property and transact business in West
Virginia upon complying with the required provisions "and not
otherwise". Such corporations so complying have all the rights,
powers and privileges subject to the same regulations, restrictions
and liabilities conferred and imposed upon local chartered corporations. This is carried to the extent that a foreign croporation,
entering West Virginia, may have the power of eminent domain
in West Virginia even when such corporation does not possess such
power in the state of its incorporation. '
So far as foreign corporations are concerned transacting business in West Virginia, the general law which Judge Poffenbarger
had described as "comity",8 are governed by the provisions of
the Revised Code." Consequently, a foreign corporation coming
into West Virginia to transact business does so by virtue of the
authority of the Legislature. It would seem that such foreign
corporation so entering West Virginia should have no powers
therein beyond those granted by the state of incorporation and
authorized in West Virginia except, of course, any such foreign
corporation carrying on interstate or foreign commerce, and this
distinction is recognized in the case of Floyd v. National Loan and
Investment Co. '
10§

180.

"A state can refuse to allow a foreign corporation to do business

within the state."
§ 181: "A state can impose any terms upon a foreign corporation
doing business within the State, unless it is forbidden to do so by the
Constitution of the United States."
CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 79; c. 31, art. 8, § 5 (banking
institutions); c. 33, art. 8, § 16 (fraternal societies); c. 33, art. 3, § 12
(foreign insurance companies).
Pittsburgh Hydro-Electric Co. v. Liston, 70 W. Va. 83, 73 S. E. 86, 40

11W. VA. REv.

L. R. A. (N. S.) 602 (1911).
Floyd v. National Loan & Investment Co., supra n. 2.
0. 31, art. 1, § 79.

61Supra n. 2.
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The Restatement recognizes that states cannot constitutionally
compel foreign corporations to relinquish any right secured by
the Constitution of the United States, as a condition of doing or
continuing to do business in the state." Neither can a state constitutionally provide that a foreign corporation may do or continue
to do business in the state only upon condition that it agrees not
to remove or attempt to remove any case to the federal courts or
does not bring its suit therein.' No West Virginia decisions have
been found on this proposition, but none are deemed necessary,
as it is believed the Restatement states merely the general law
in this respect.
The Restatement provides in Section 186 that
"Where a foreign corporation desires to carry on both
interstate and intrastate commerce within a State, terms imposed for the doing of intrastate commerce are unconstitutional if they unduly burden the interstate commerce of the
corporation."
The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals in the case of
Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanane arose under chapter 5 of the
Acts of the Special Session of the Legislature of 1919. This Act
was one providing for the levy of a privilege tax of two cents per
barrel on oil and one-third of one cent per thousand cubic feet of
natural gas on the transportation of oil and gas by means of pipe
lines. It was contended by the plaintiff that the Act imposed a
tax upon the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce within
the State of West Virginia, and on an application for an injunction against the State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia, it was
held by the Supreme Court of Appeals that the Act being sus.
ceptible of two constructions, one of which was that it did not
impose a tax upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce but "only upon the privilege of engaging in transporting
in intrastate commerce within the confines of the State of West
Virginia" was valid "and so long as they did not engage in intrastate business penalties prescribed by the Act would not apply to
them."
On a writ of error obtained from the Supreme Court of
the United States!' in a decision voiced by Mr. Justice Holmes
(Mr. Justice Clark, Mr. Justice Pitney and Mr. Justice Brandeis,

goRESTATEMENT, §
7 RESTATEMENT,

182.
§ 183.

83Supra n. 17.
8 Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Halanan, supra n. 17.
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dissenting) the decision was reversed. This case is cited because
it is believed the decision recognizes the principle stated in Section 186 of the Restatement.
In Section 187 of the Restatement it is provided
"A State cannot constitutionally require that a foreign
corporation as a condition of engaging within the State solely
in interstate commerce designate a principal place of business
or file an annual statement of condition or satisfy certain
standards in respect to its financial structure or condition."
The Supreme Court of West Virginia has decided in accord with
this section.'
The Underwood Typewriter Company cases was one in which
a demurrer to a plea in abatement was sustained. A plea in abatement averred that the Typewriter Company had not complied with
the provisions of the Code,' but it was held that a foreign corporation which sells and delivers its goods, wares and merchandise
or other articles of trade and commerce in this state upon orders
taken by its agents and traveling salesmen and forwarded to it and
not otherwise and transacts no other business in the state is not
required to comply with the provisions of said statute and cannot be denied the power to bring and maintain suits and actions
for the enforcement of such contracts because such corporation
does not transact or carry on business within the State of West
Virginia.
Where a foreign corporation has been admitted to do business in the state and the right to do such business is subsequently
taken away in a quo warranto action, such corporation having
made contracts within the state during the period when it was
lawfully admitted to do business has the right to prosecute actions
in the state to enforce its contract rights so obtained.' This is in
accord with Section 189 of the Restatement."
" Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Piggott, 60 W. Va. 532, 55 S. E. 664 (1907).
The general principle is recognized in Floyd v. National Loan & Investment
Co., supra n. 2.
Supra n. 90.
0ow

W. VA. Rzv. CoDE (1931)

c. 31, art. 1,

§

79.

03Comstock v. Droney Lumber Co., 69 W. Va. 100, 71 S. E. 255 (1911);
Bilbmyer Lumber Co. v. Merchants' Coal Co. of W. Va., 66 W. Va. 696, 66
S. E. 1073, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1101 (1910).
""After a foreign corporation has been permitted to do business in
a State, and the corporaton in pursuance of the permission has made
contracts and acquired property in the State, the State cannot constitutionally forbid the corporation to continue to do business or own property
in the State if the effect of such action would be to impair the obligation
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The transacting of business by a foreign corporation in the
State of West Virginia without having complied with the requirements of the Revised Code is made a misdemeanor.' The Restatement in Section 192 provides as follows:
"Where doing business in a state by a foreign corporation
which has not complied with the requirements of the law of
the state is prohibited or is declared unlawful (whether or
not a penalty is imposed on the corporation or its officers or
shareholders),
(a) no rights will arise in favor of the corporation on a contract made in the state in doing business therein prior to
compliance;
(b) an assignee of the rights of the corporation will be barred from recovery on the contract to the same extent
that the corporation is barred, unless the assignee is a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument received
by the corporation in the carrying on of its business;
(c) compliance by the corporation with the terms for doing
business by it within the state will not give to the corporation rights upon a contract entered into in the state
while engaged in business in the state prior to such compliance."
These provisions of the Restatement seem to be contrary to
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.'
In Toledo Tie & Lumber Co. v. Thomas,' a foreign corporation
created and organized under the laws of the State of Ohio, without complying with the then requirements of the Code, entered
into a contract with the defendant for professional services and
for personal property to be delivered in Pleasants County. The
defendant becoming financially embarrassed made an assignment
for the benefit of his creditors, and an application was made for
an injunction against the trustees in the deed of assignment from
taking possession of the personal property. Two special pleas
were filed, the second of which was to the effect that plaintiff
being a foreign corporation under the laws of Ohio, doing business
of the contracts of the corporation, to deprive it of the property so
acquired without due process of law, or to deny it the equal protection
of the laws."
OrC. 31, art. 1, § 79.
Toledo Tie & Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 33 W. Va. 566, 11 S. E. 37, 25 Am.
St. Rep. 925 (1890). Contracts of foreign building and loan associations
doing business in this State are not rendered void by reason of failure to
comply with this section. Burkheimer v. Association, 59 W. Va. 209, 53 S.
E. 372, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1047 (1906); Thompson v. Association, 57 W. Va.
551, 50 S. E. 756 (1906).
7SBupra n. 96.
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in this state without having complied with the provisions of the
Code prayed for abatement of the suit. The Code section then required a foreign corporation to file a copy of its charter with the
Secretary of State and also to file in each county in which it did
business a certificate of the Secretary of State that it had so filed
such copy of its charter in his office, and it made the violation of
the statute a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $500 to $1,000
for each month's failure to comply. There being no public policy
of West Virginia, which was contravened by permitting such corporations as the plaintiff to do business in this state without complying with the section of the Code and the Legislature not having expressly declared such result should follow from a failure to
comply with the statute, the court held that such contract was not
to be held absolutely void and unenforceable in the State of West
Virginia.
The present Code now provides as to foreign corporations:
". ...
No corporation chartered under the laws of any
other state or jurisdiction shall hold any property or transact any business or bring or maintain any action, suit or proceeding in this State without having complied with the requirements hereinbefore stated ....
and its failure so to do
may be pleaded in abatement of any action, suit or proceeding
instituted by it; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to lessen the liability of any corporation which may
not have complied with the requirements of this section upon
any contract or for any wrong. No such corporation shall
hold any property or transact any business, or bring or maintain any action, suit or proceeding in this State, where the
cause of action arises out of the holding of property or doing
business therein, without first complying with the provisions
'
hereof ..
It would seem, therefore, that under the present Code, a different
result might be obtained than was obtained in the case of Toledo
Tie & Lumber Co. v. Thomas. Notwithstanding the inhibition
against bringing suits, our Code expressly provides
"but nothing herein contained shall be construed to lessen
the liability of any corporation which may not have complied
with the requirements of this section upon any contract or
for any wrong.""
This provision of the Code by implication at least recognizes the
08W. VA. RBv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 79.
00Idem.
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statement of Section 197 of the Restatement as follows: "A foreign
corporation, by doing business in a state without complying with
terms imposed by the state, is not prevented from defending
actions brought against it in the courts of the state." It is believed, however, that the case of Toledo Tie & Lumber Co. v.
Thomas is in accord with Section 198 of the Restatement, which
provides:
"A foreign corporation, doing business in a state without complying with the terms imposed by the state, can acquire and transfer property situated there even though such
acquisition or transfer is made in pursuance of a contract
entered into within the state."
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